IN DETAIL: Extra roles for the RAAF’s F-35As?

Just before the end of 2024 the RAAF received the last nine of 72 F-35A Lightning IIs it has ordered from Lockheed Martin in Fort Worth. That is as much as the Australian government says the RAAF needs. The stated requirement for these aircraft under Project AIR6000 remains 100, and the Opposition has promised it will fund those remaining 28 aircraft if it wins Australia’s forthcoming general election; but nobody is holding their breath at the moment waiting for an order for them and the RAAF may be looking to an additional role for its aircraft in any case.

Gregor Ferguson

The F-35A Lightning II is at the heart of the RAAF’s highly prized status as one of the world’s few 5^thgeneration fighting forces.

But in about 15 years’ time the RAAF may be looking to replace its 4^th generation F/A-18F Super Hornets and EA-18G Growlers with an even more potent 6^th generation capability. Some of that 6^th generation capability may fly alongside the F-35A well before this, and the roles of the F-35A may change as a result.

So how would the RAAF use its F-35As? There are probably two things to bear in mind here: firstly, the ‘kill ratio’ the Lightning II has amassed in realistic exercises such as Red Flag; and, secondly, its ability to build Situational Awareness (SA) and share this and targeting data with friendly ‘nodes’.

It should be added that the actual business of flying and fighting in an F-35 has changed dramatically. It needs to be a much easier aircraft to fly than its 4^th generation predecessors because pilots will be focussed on information management, rather than flying the aircraft. The amount of data generated by the aircraft has grown exponentially, which is why the fusion that combines this data into useable information for the pilot is so important. Tactical employment of the F-35 needs a complete change in mindset – everybody who has flown an F-35 understands this.

In Red Flag exercises at Nellis Air Force Base the F-35 has achieved a kill ratio of around 20:1, according to the Washington DC-based Lexington Institute’s online blog in late-2023. Its combination of stealth, all-round SA and good air-air weapons makes it an extremely hard aircraft to surprise and then beat.

So yes, it can fire air-air missiles, air-surface guided weapons and anti-ship missiles from a position of real advantage relative to a less sophisticated enemy. But it can also provide target data when these weapons are launched by other aircraft, or ships, or even land-based launchers. The F-35A’s ability to share SA and targeting data with anything from another F-35A to an HQ, to an E-7A Wedgetail, to a warship, to an F/A-18F Super Hornet to an RQ-4C Triton means the F-35A is more than just a ‘shooter’. Even more so than the F-22 before it, the F-35A can act as a significant force multiplier for them all.

So the F-35A’s area of influence is much greater than the reach of the weapons it actually carries. And if we factor in potential use by an F-35A of a semi-stealthy Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) such as the autonomous MQ-28A Ghost Bat Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft, or the Anduril Fury and GA-ASI XQ-67A selected by the US Air Force, this could extend the F-35A’s area of influence even further.

The Ghost Bat is due for an Australian trial in the ‘loyal wingman’ ISR role later this calendar year, a trial which is the potential start of a 6^th generation capability. That capability is possible because of the data that can be exchanged between an F-35 and a Ghost Bat. Even an F/A-18F Super Hornet generates useful data so ensuring they all have the right sort of data links makes sense.

The point is that an F-35A can be both a shooter and a part of the ADF’s Defence Targeting Enterprise (a trick that’s beyond most 4^th generation aircraft because they weren’t designed with so much connectivity in mind) and a step towards a ‘kill web’ rather than just a ‘kill chain’.

You can’t attack Australia without coming from a long way away or, if you are close, making the preparations to do so under the nose of the ADF. The F-35 can certainly do any shooting that’s necessary, though there’s a limit to its ambitions – the RAAF is still quite a small force. However, its stealth means it can also place sensors well forward in the battle area so that it can provide targeting and SA data to trusted nodes – and this might become one of its more important roles going forward.

There’s a lot more to the F-35A in RAAF service than meets the eye.

F-35 features

It’s worth recapping on the capabilities the F-35A Lightning II brings to the Australian Defence Force and the wider region. EX² was updated on a trip to the F-35’s manufacturer, Lockheed Martin, in Ft Worth, Texas, just before the end of 2024.

The F-35 is a 5^th generation stealthy fighter. What does that mean? To over-simplify somewhat (there has been plenty of coverage elsewhere), a 5^th generation aircraft is stealthy, has advanced sensors, a high degree of sensor fusion (which also reduces the pilot’s workload), and the aircraft contributes to and is strengthened by network-enabled operations.

Stealth provides a level of what Lockheed Martin terms ‘impunity’. It helps prevent (or delay) an enemy detecting the aircraft, it disrupts his kill chain and, if nothing else, it makes the stealthy aircraft’s counter-measures even more effective.

The F-35’s sensor suite includes Northrop Grumman’s X-band AN/APG-81 AESA radar and AN/AAQ-37 infrared Distributed Aperture System. The radar is usually operated passively for stealth reasons, acting as a receiver rather than an emitter, while the AAQ-37’s six cameras mounted around the airframe provide spherical Situational Awareness (SA). The AAQ-37 enables multiple functions: missile detection and tracking; launch point detection, SA Infrared Search and Track System (SAIRST) and weapons cueing, weapons support and day/night navigation.

Another system, the AAQ-40, mounts its EOTS (Electro-Optic Targeting System) sensor behind the diamond-shaped structure under the aircraft’s nose to conduct laser targeting, FLIR (Forward-Looking Infra Red) and long-range IRST.

Sensor Fusion brings all of these (and other) sensor outputs together to create what Lockheed Martin describes as 3D Situational Awareness (SA) on the cockpit’s single large screen and projected inside the pilot’s helmet. The F-35’s 9 million lines of computer code enable the aircraft to datalink SA, sensor and targeting information to other F-35s as well as to 4^th generation aircraft using a mix of Link 16 and MADL, the F-35-specific Multi-functional Advanced Data Link (MADL).

The MADL is a Low Probability of Intercept (LPI) Radio Frequency (RF) link that equips all F-35s. The connectivity it enables – targeting information and shared SA – is part of the ‘secret sauce’ that creates a 5^thgeneration air combat capability and is a stepping stone towards the 6^th generation.

The RAAF’s F-35As could provide targeting data direct to the firing point of a GMLRS rocket. This has a range of more than 70km; obviously the Australian Army’s recently announced ground-based radars won’t be effective at that range at ground level, but an F-35A (or a bunch of other airborne RAAF assets) could provide the necessary targeting data if required.

As an example of what’s possible, in 2016 the US Marines and Navy conducted a successful Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA) trial involving an F-35B, the land-based USS Desert Ship at the White Sands Range fitted with Aegis Baseline 9 (the same version that Australia’s Hobart-class destroyers will be upgraded to), an SM-6 missile (again, the same missile that the RAN operates) and a target drone. The Aegis Baseline 9 combat system was fitted with a MADL antenna so the F-35B could communicate directly with the ‘ship’.

Three years later the US Army demonstrated almost the same capability using a USAF F-35A with its Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS) missile defence network during EX Orange Flag.

The F-35s in both demonstrations were unmodified, so it’s clear that the value of the F-35 generally lies in more than just its kinetic capabilities and stealth.

The survivability of the aircraft comes from its stealth, unsurprisingly, and its speed, combined with its SA: it can see almost all threats in good enough time to respond or run away, and do so quickly enough that it enjoys a level of impunity. Because it can carry a full warload of fuel (18,000lb+) and weapons internally, it remains 9g-capable at all weights and therefore manoeuvrable, unlike aircraft which carry external weapons and fuel tanks which cause significant drag. Of course, it can carry additional weapons and fuel tanks externally if circumstances require.

The range of weapons which the RAAF’s F-35As will carry internally has grown somewhat. Along with the AIM-120C AMRAAM, the aircraft can carry AIM-9X Sidewinders, GBU-31 Joint Direct Attack Munitions, the Kongsberg Joint Strike Missile (JSM) and GBU-16 Paveway II Laser Guided Bombs (LGBs). All of these weapons can, of course, be carried externally if circumstances allow, or dictate.

There seem to be no plans at present to arm RAAF F-35As with the Lockheed Martin AGM-158C Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM), nor its older stablemate, the AGM-158A Joint Air-Surface Stand-off Missile (JASSM), though the US Navy and Marines have done external-carriage integration trials of the F-35B and -C with all of the AGM-158 family. However, the RAAF is considering its intended 900km-range JASSM-ER for external carriage by the F-35A.

Aircraft deliveries

The F-35 is currently being delivered from three Final Assembly and Check-Out (FACO) facilities: in Ft Worth; Cameri, Italy (which is now producing F-35s for the Netherlands and Switzerland as well as Italy); and Nagoya, Japan. It’s Lockheed Martin’s boast that the F-35 has never lost a sales competition to a rival aircraft: some 20 countries have now ordered the F-35 and 16 services are now flying it in its three separate marks: the Conventional Take-Off and Landing (CTOL) F-35A; the Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) F-35B and the F-35C which has an extended wing for carrier operations.

More than 1,110 aircraft have been delivered of more than 3,500 aircraft ordered and between them they have achieved a total of more than 1 million flying hours – this is climbing at more than 25,000 hours a month. At the time of writing only one operator had achieved Final Operating Capability (FOC); despite this, some nine of these operators have taken their F-35s to war and as far as can be determined, no F-35s have been lost to enemy action.

In fact, the crash rate (fatal or otherwise) for the F-35 has been less than half of the F-22, which was in turn just over one fifth of the A-10, which in its turn was slightly lower than the F-15 and F-16, an analysis by Aerotime magazine found. The figures also took into account aircraft availability. The F-35 has achieved a crash rate of less than one-twelfth that of the 4^th generation F-16, which came from the same factory: “So, does the F-35 crash more than older jets?” it asked rhetorically. “Absolutely not. In fact, it crashes substantially less than, say, the F-15 or the F-16 back when they were new.”

The nine RAAF F-35As delivered just before Christmas 2024 came from production Lot 15, at a unit cost of US$82.5 million, including engines. They are all in Technology Refresh 3 (TR-3) configuration; the RAAF’s earlier jets were delivered in TR-2 configuration. All will be updated to TR-3 at Williamtown and will then be upgraded (again at Williamtown) to Block 4, a process that is expected to take months per aircraft, not weeks, according to Lockheed Martin.

The TR-3 upgrade includes a new open mission systems architecture, a new mission computer core processor and new cockpit displays. Together these provide up to 25 times more computing power than TR-2 and enable the full Block 4 upgrade.

The Block 4 upgrade enables 75 new features on the aircraft, though some of the most important are integration of the new Northrop Grumman AN/APG-85 AESA radar, the ability to carry six, rather than four, AIM-120C AMRAAM air-air missiles internally, and the integration of the internals of Lockheed Martin’s proven Sniper Networked Targeting Pod. This will include a Mobile Ad-hoc Network (MANET) radio to support a secure mesh network that embraces allied air, land and maritime platforms and enables real-time sharing of sensor and target track information between the F-35, 4^th generation fighters such as the F-16 and F/A-18, ground-based command and control centres (which can pass this information on to ground-based missiles such as GMLRS and PrSM) and warships.

Sustainment

By 2035 there should be more than 350 F-35s in the Pacific region, operated by Australia, Japan, Korea, Singapore and the USA. Lockheed Martin is responsible for sustaining the global F-35 fleet and has established a local Maintenance Repair and Overhaul (MRO) hub for the F-35 at RAAF Base Williamtown, north of Sydney. It has been working with the F-35 Joint Program Office in Washington DC to create a network of vendors to sustain other F-35s operating in, or deployed to, the Indo-Pacific region.

These will be maintained by Lockheed Martin’s principal Australian sub-contractor, BAE Systems Australia, and other local industry suppliers at Williamtown and BAE Systems Australia is working under two Defence contracts worth some $210 million in all to create 13 F-35 servicing bays at Williamtown.

Lockheed Martin is still the prime contractor for the troubled F-35 Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS). This continues to be fielded by all F-35 operators, including the Royal Australian Air Force, says Lockheed Martin. But the F-35 JPO has established the Operational Data Integrated Network (ODIN), working with several industry partners including Lockheed Martin and engine supplier Pratt & Whitney, along with multiple US government organisations such as USAF Kessel Run (formerly the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Detachment 12) and the USN Naval Information Warfare Center.

The ODIN software is owned by the US government, but as the F-35 original equipment manufacturer, Lockheed Martin supports the ongoing development, installation, integration, training and delivery of both ALIS and ODIN, the company says.

One of the features of the FACO lines is an Acceptance Test Facility (formerly called a Signature Measurement Facility) which sees every aircraft built at that FACO subjected to an RF and IR signature measurement test. The US Government guarantees a certain level of ‘stealthiness’ to all F-35 customers and the test facility is designed to ensure that each aircraft achieves this level.

What the company has also found is that it takes half as many man hours per flying hour to maintain the ‘stealth’ of the F-35 family. This is reportedly a significant improvement on the F-22 stealth fighter and an order of magnitude improvement over the much older F-117 which both used earlier stealth coatings and demanded a much higher ratio of manhours to flying hours to maintain their stealth signatures. This included very careful attention to detail in servicing and turning around the aircraft between sorties.

Mass-producing a stealthy aircraft such as the F-35, and especially one which has significantly reduced signature maintenance needs, demands high levels of precision, repeatability and reliability in manufacturing and application of surface coatings at the FACOs, as well as sustainment. Even so, one would assume that BAE Systems Australia’s Williamtown facility will, in due course, be equipped with an Acceptance Test Facility, especially if it’s repairing or replacing things like surface coatings and access panel covers. Such a facility is ‘in consideration’ for Williamtown, says Lockheed Martin, though the customer will have an important say also.

The Australian contribution to the F-35 global supply chain remains significant. About 70 Australian companies have achieved more than $4 billion in sales to Lockheed Martin, including companies manufacturing engine trolleys as a sole-source and companies supplying titanium and composite rear fuselage components.

The F-35 was designed as a ‘shooter’: its stealth enables the aircraft to deliver air-air and air-surface weapons in a highly congested and contested environment. But that stealth also enables the aircraft to put sensors into hostile airspace and then share SA and targeting data with friendlies. That, just quietly, may become what it’s known for. Ask me in twenty years’ time.

Disclosure: EX²  visited the F-35A assembly line at Fort Worth as a guest of Lockheed Martin Australia.